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I.N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
========================================= 
S'.i'ATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, PETITION FOR REHEARING 
vs. 
ALEX ORNELAS, Case No. 10879 
Appellant. 
========================================= 
Appellant moves the court for a rehearing on appellant's appeal and for 
modification of the Court's order for a new trial, to grant the defendant 
herein an acquittal on said matters. 
lo The decision of the court granting a new trial in the above entitled 
matter, is contrary to law. At trial the defendant was found guilty of 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor in that defendant "took Wanda 
Palmer" without the knowledge or consent of the parents. However, defendant 
was charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor "by hypodermically 
administering drugs." Defendant is entitled to be charged with a specific 
crime so that he may know the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, and the effect of the judgment of guilty of "taking" is to find him 
not guilty of "administering drugs", which was the only violation of which 
defendant has been chargedo Defendant was thereby substantially prejudiced 
in his defense upon the merits and is entitled to an acquittal. 
2 0 Defendant's constitutional rights entitling him to due process of 
law, were violated in that he was convicted upon a charge that was not made 
against him. It is clear that where a charge is not substantiated by the 
evidence introduced, it amounts to a due process violation to impose a 
conviction on other grounds. 
3.. Defendant has been placed in jeopardy once on the basis of the 
acts here in question, before competent court and that court failed to find 
d~fendant guilty of the violations charged. The constitution prohibits 
the courts from again placing defendant in jeopardy for the same offense. 
I:buble jeopardy is not against double punishment for the same offense, but 
is protection against double jeopardy, that is a second trial for the same 
offense. The idea underlying the doctrine is that the state with all its 
resources and power, should not be allowed to place a person in jeopardy 
more than once for the same offense thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety 
and insecurityo Having been brougnt before a competent court once on the 
basis of his alleged actions and the court having failed to find him guilty, 
defendant is entitled to an acquittal in the above entitled matter. 
ARGUMENT 
The decision of this court on defendant's appeal seems to be based on 
a finding that the trial court erred in convicting him for violation of 
U.C.A. § 55-10-80(3) when he was charged with a violation of§ 55-10-80(1). 
However, there is nothing in the trial court record or in the briefs of 
appellant or respondent to allege error on the part of the trial court. 
The case of Cobb v. Snow, 14 Utah 2d 170, 380 P. 2d 457 (1963), has been cited 
by the court for the proposition that "where defendant claims of error and 
a judgment is nullified at his request, what he is entitled to is a fair 
trial eliminating the error." That case deals with the situation in which 
there has been a trial, evidence presented on the issues, but errors committed 
therein are sufficient to deny him justice. However, that case did not even 
consider the question in point here as to when the court finds defendant 
guilty of a violation with which he has not been charged or in other words 
not insufficiency of evidence or error therein, but a total absence of 
admissible evidence on the crime with which he was convicted. Cobb v. Snow 
is clearly not in point here, and to find defendant guilty of an offense 
of which he has not been charged, is contrary to the law. 
In State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 111 P. 2d 455 (1942) this Court 
observed: 
"The purpose of a bill of particulars, is to inform the defendant of 
the particulars of the offense sufficiently to enable him to prepare 
his defense." 
It is clear that at conunon law, a variance WITH RESPECT TO A MATERIAL 
~~TTER was fatal and entitled the defendant to an acquittal. The Utah 
Code provides that: 
"No variance between the allegations of an information, indicbnent, 
or bill of particular, which state the particulars of an offense 
' ' wnether amended or not, and the evidence offered in support thereof 
shall be grounds for an acquittal of the defendant." U.C.A. § 77-21-43(2) 
(1953). 
This court in State v. Meyers, 5 Utah 2d 365, 302 P. 2d 276 (1956), 
noted that the foregoing statute applies to matters of form NOT SUBSTANCE, 
and that the statute could not override the constitutional guarantee that 
"the accused shall have the right to demand the nature and the cause of the 
c.ccusation against himo" The court concluded: 
"It VJOuld be a mockery of the Constitutional right of a defendant to 
allow the state to falsely state the particulars of the offense charged, 
and then without amendment, and without giving defendant additional 
tirn<=> to meet new evidence beyond these particulars obtain a conviction 
fow1ded on these particulars • • • • To be material the variance must 
go to tJ1e extent of showing the offense proved is not the offense 
charged." 
It is a rule of universal recognition that the allegations and the proof 
must correspond and if there is a variance as to a matter of substance and 
which is material to the proof of said charges it is the basis for acquittal 
thereon. The fatality of the variance depends "not on whether it is in 
res~ect of a material matter, BUT on whether the VARIANCE ITSELF is material, 
or affects the substantial right of the accused." (Emphasis added.) 42 CJS, 
Indicb~ents and Information § 254. 
This court reversed the conviction of a defendant charged with ernbezzel-
ing concluding: 
was 
"In a criminal proceeding it is not sufficient to show merely that the 
accused has been dishonest, or that he is a cheater, or otherwise bad 
character. He is entitled to be charged with a specific crime so that 
he may know the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and the 
STATE MUST PROVE SUBSTANTIALLY AS CHARGED, the offense it relies upon 
for conviction." State v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 104, 378 P. 2d 352 (1963)0 
The conviction of defendant upon grounds with which he was not charged, 
in violation of his constitutional right entitling him to due process 
of law under Utah Constitution, Article 1, § 7 and the 14~ Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. In 21 Am. ~· 2d, Criminal Law, § 226 instructions 
of th'? U.S. Suprerne Court were outlined: 
"It is similarly a violu.tion of due process to convict a man upon a 
charge which was not made, (Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 
s. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 59.5° Ct. 
255 81 L. Ed. 278). Accordingly where a conviction is so devoid of 
evi~entiary support as to amount t~ a due process violation, THE COURT 
CP.J IT JOT concern itself with whether the evidence proves commission of 
~~ome other crime, Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 82 S. Ct. 248, 
7 L 0 Ed. 2 0 7 • II 
-3-
In 
addition to the foregoing, defendant has now been placed in jeopardy 
once on the charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor "by admin-
istering drugso" He was brought before a competent court and tried for his 
actions and it is clear that to require him to come before the court again 
on the same charge, would place him in double jeopardy in violation of 
Article 1 s 12 of the Utah Consti'tuti'on d 
s an the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
"vJl1ere an accused has once been placed on trial in a court com-
petent to try an offense of the character charged, and has been 
found not guilty of said offense, tr,e state can never place him 
on trial again for the same offense no matter how irregular the 
proceedings have been." 22 CJS, Criminal Law, § 268. 
Defr~ndr.;nt was charged with violation of § 55-10-80(1) and found guilty 
of violating § 55-10-80(3). The effect of such a conviction is to find him 
not guilty of violating§ 55-10-80(1)0 The State cannot therefore retry 
defendant for his actions once he has already been placed in jeopardy for 
L~e same acts. This court in discussing double jeopardy stated that the 
plea of double jeopardy is sufficient whenever it shows that the second trial 
is based on the same criminal act, both in fact and in law, which was the 
basis of an indictment on which the defendant was formerly brought to trialo 
State Vo Thomoson, 58 Utah 291, 199 Pac. 161 (1921); see also, Price Vo United 
States, 156 Fed. 950 (9~ Ciro 1907); Dill Vo Colorado, 19 Coloo 469, 36 Pac. 
229 (1894); State v. Danhof, 161 Wash. 441, 297 Pctco 195 (1931)0 
The court has therefore placed defendant in the position where he cannot 
be tried again without violation of his constitutional rights, but yet he 
hJ.S. freedom on the basis of a conviction which this court is deprived of 
has reversed. 
th t th court grant him a rehearing of WHEREFORE, appellant prays a e 
· f the court's order for a new trial appellant's appeal for a modification o 
to grant the defendant herein, an acquittal on said mattero 
DATED this .S?r ~ay of &~Cf~_)_ , 1967. 
SALT LAKs?coUNTY BAR LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
-4-
// ,. 
//' ' 
/I / ! 
/ -~· -~ "-;. .. - /' 
-: • L • "-- t ...,, . 
Ronald No Boyce 
Attorney for Appellant 
431 South 3rd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
/ 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ST ATEl\'IENT OF NATURE OF CASE ________ I 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT____ I 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL __________________ 2 
STATE_MENT OF FACTS---------------------------------- 2 
ARGUlVlENT 
POINT I 
1\1 AT E RI AL VARIANCE BETWEEN 
PLEADING AND PROOF IS _FATAL AND 
ENTITLES APPELLANT TO AN AC-
QUIT'TAL. ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5 
POINT II 
FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO WAIVE 
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A 
JURY TRIAL IN OPEN COURT AS RE-
QUIRED BY LA1'7" IS RE VE RS IBLE 
ERROR AND THE CASE SHOULD BE RE-
MANDED FOR A NE1V TRIAL. -------------------- 12 
POINT III 
AN INCOMPLETE RECORD BASED ON 
THE USE OF A DICTAPHONE "\VHERE 
APPEAL IS A MATTER OF RIGHT NEC-
ESSITATES A REMAND FOR NEW 
TRIAL BECAUSE: 
1 
Page 
1) APPELLANT HAS BEEN DENIED 
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTEC-
TION OF LAWS. -----------------·····-··-·-·----············· 20 
2) THIS COURT HAS NOTHING TO RE-
VIE'V 'VITH RESPECT TO THE OMIT-
TED TESTIMONY. ·-······-······------------·····-······· 24 
3) THE USE OF A MECHANICAL DE-
VICE IS NOT AN AUTHORIZED DE-
VICE FOR RECORDING TESTIMONY 
IN AN ADULT OFFENDER CASE IN 
THE JUVENILE COURT AND THE 
DISTORTION OF THE RECORD SUB-
VERTS APPELLANT'S STATUTORY 
RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM A FINAL 
CONVICTION.---------·--·····--·------·------·-·-···-----·-··-·· 26 
POINT IV 
THERE 'VAS A COMPLETE ABSENCE 
OF PROOF THAT THE COMPLAINING 
WITNESS WAS INJECTED WITH A 
DRUG AND THAT THE ACTS COM-
PLAINED OF 'VERE DONE WITHOUT 
THE KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT OF 
THE COMPLAINING WITNESS' PAR-
ENTS OR THAT THE ACTS CONTRIB-
UTED TO THE MINOR'S DELINQUENCY. 30 
CASES 
Chessman v. Teets 
354 U.S. 156 (1957) ······················--···------····-··-······· 23 
Commonwealth v. Stone 
300 Mass. 160, 14 N.E. 2d 158 (1938) ............ 11 
Elliott v. State 
5 Okla. Crim. Reporter 63, 113 Pac. 213 
(1911) --··············----·--·-··--··-·-·----·······--··-···-·····-······· 30 
11 
Griffin v. Illinois 
Page 
351 U.S. 12 ( 1956) .............................................. 20 
Palko v. Connecticut 
320 U.S. 319 (1937) .................................... 23, 24 
Peef er v. State 
42 Ohio App. 276, 182 N.E. 117 (1931) ........ 34 
People v. Garcia 
98 Cal. App. 702, 277 Pack 747 (1929) ............ 14 
People v. Smith 
41 N.Y.S. 2d 512, 266 App. Div. 57 (1943) .... 35 
People v. Spinale 
100 C.A. 600, 280 Pack 691 (1940) ................ 14 
People v. \Vashington 
95 C.A. 2d 454, 213 P. 2d 70 (1950) ................ 15 
State Y. Baum 
47 Utah 7, 151 Pac. 518 (1915) .......... 25, 28, 30 
State Y. Beckendorff 
4 Utah 79,, 10 P. 1073 (1923) .................... 7, 12 
State v. Brune 
69 Utah 444, 256 Pac. 109 (1927) .................. 19 
State v. Clark 
92 Ohio App. 382, 110 N.E. 2d 433 (1952) .... 34 
State v. Meyers 
5 Utah 2d 365, 302 P. 2d 276 (1956) ...... 8, 9, 10 
State v. Spencer 
101 Utah 274, 111 P. 2d 455 (1942) .............. 7 
State v. Taylor 
14 Utah 2d 107, 378 P. 2d 252 (1961) ............ 10 
STATUTES AND AUTHORITIES 
Aldrich, Dynamic Psychiatry ( 1966) ........................ 32 
42 C.J.S., Indictments and Informations 
§ 254 (1944) ························································ 7 
iii 
82 C.J.S. Stenographers 
Page 
§ 9 (1953) ............................................................ 29 
California Constitution 
Article I, § 7 ........................................................ 14 
Sound Recording in the Courtroom: 
A Reappraisal 47 ABA J ll85 ( 1961) ............ 29 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction 
§ 4706 (3rd Ed. 1943) ........................................ 17 
Utah Code Annotated,§ 55-10-80(1) (1953) 
Laws of Utah 1965 ........................................ 7, 34 
Utah Code Annotated, § 55-10-80 (3) (1953) 
Laws of Utah 1965 ........................ 5, 6, 7, 33, 34 
Utah Code Annotated, § 55-10-81 (1953) 
added by ch. 165 § 19 (1965) .... 13, 16, 17, 18, 27 
Utah Code Annotated, § 55-10-96 (1953) 
added by ch. 165 § 35 (1965) .................... 26, 28 
Utah Code Annotated, § 77-1-ll (1953) .......... 13, 17 
Utah Code Annotated, § 77-21-43(2) (1953) ........ 8 
Utah Code Annotated,§ 77-21-43(4) (1953) ........ 9 
Utah Code Annotated, § 77-27-2 (1953) .... 13, 16, 19 
Utah Code Annotated, § 77-39-3 (1953) .......... 21, 30 
Utah Code Annotated, § 77-56-1 (1953) ................ 27 
Utah Code Annotated, § 77-56-2 (1953) ................ 27 
Utah Constitution 
Article I, § 12 ················································ 8, 12 
1V 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ALEX ORNELAS, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE O.F UTAH, ) 
Respondent, 
Case No. 
10879 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE~IENT O.F NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Alex Ornelas, appeals his conviction 
in the Juvenile Court of the Second District Court, 
State of Utah for the crime of contributing to the de-
linquency of a minor. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
The appellant was charged with contributing to 
the delinquency of a minor by hypodermically admin-
1 
istering drugs. The trial court found the appellant 
guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 
but not by the manner and means alleged in the com-
plaint. Subsequent to conviction the court entered 
judgment imposing a sentence of confinement to jail 
for six months, suspended upon condition that the ap-
pellant be committed to the Utah State Prison on 
parole violation. The appellant is presently in the Utah 
State Penitentiary on the conviction in the instant case 
for which his parole was violated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant submits the decision of the trial court 
should be dismissed and a judgment of acquittal 
granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The complaint in the instant case charged appel· 
lant with contributing to the delinquency of a minor 
by "hypodermically administering drugs" to the com· 
plaining witness ( R. 60) . The trial judge in his find· 
ings of fact and conclusions of law found that appellant 
"took ~Tanda Palmer" without the consent of her par· 
ents, thereby contribut:ing to the delinquency of a 
minor (R. 47). 
The complaining witness was released temporarily 
from the Utah State Mental Hospital for appearance 
at trial. She had been sent to the hospital, in the words 
2 
of the complaining witness, "for sniffing glue and for 
using dope''. (Tr. line 17, p. 2). 
The complaining witness testified that a friend of 
hers took her to the defendant's aparament. "\Vhen 
asked by the prosecutor to give the name of the friend 
she said, "I won't answer that.'' (Tr. line 29, p. 4). 
\Vhen told by the prosecutor that she must answer, she 
responded, "No, I won't" (Tr. line 32, p. 4). 
She did not know even the general location of the 
apartment where she was taken, but merely that it was 
in the city (Tr. line 23, p. 4) . The prosecutor then 
asked what she did after meeting appellant in his 
apartment. He said, "did you go anywhere with him, 
did you do anything with him, did you have any further 
contacts with him?" and she answered, "No" (Tr. line 
12, p. 5). "\Vhen asked if there were other people in the 
apartment she said, "I don't know" (Tr. line 3, p. 5). 
"\Yhen asked the same question again by the prosecutor 
she said, "I think so" (Tr. line 32, p. 5). The same 
question rephrased by the prosecutor produced the re-
sponse, "I don't know'' (Tr. line 18, p. 6). 
\Vhen asked whether she used the needle herself 
the record shows, "Miss Palmer: (inaudible)" (Tr. 
32, p. 6). "\Vhen again asked what happened to the 
needle she said, "I used it ... I stuck it in me" (Tr. 
line 4 & 6, p. 8). "\Vhen asked once more, "did you 
stick it in yourself?" (Tr. line 7, p. 8), she said, "I 
can't remember" (Tr. line 8, p. 8 ) . Later she said with 
3 
refence to the needle, "He let me ... He gave me an 
injection of" (Tr. line 10 and 12, p. 9). 
The contents of the needle were said to be a white 
liquid (Tr. line 2, p. 8). The fact that the liquid was a 
drug and not sugar and water, or milk was not proven 
at trial. 
After leaving appellant's apartment the complain-
ing witness stayed four days in a hotel during which 
time she did not see appellant (Tr. line 32, p. 10). 
During those four days she admitted that the people 
whom she was staying with gave her drugs three times 
a day (Tr. line 19, p. 17). At the end of four days she 
went to see her sister-in-law, whose immediate response 
was, in the words of the complaining witness as follows: 
" ( S) he thought something was wrong. She 
thought I had been sniffing glue ... " (Tr. line 
l,p.19). 
Her sister-in-law then took her to the University 
Hospital where a medical student asked to give her a 
physical examination and she refused. He said that her 
arms had puncture holes in them but could form no 
opinion as to how long it had been since the initial 
punctures. (Tr. line 2, p. 30). The medical student 
testified that he took some blood to test the barbituate 
level. He did not make the test himself, (Tr. line 12, 
p. 31), and there was no evidence introduced at trial 
as to what the results of the test produced. 
The trial judge made findings that the appellant 
"took Wanda Palmer" without the consent of her par· 
4 
en ts ( R. 47). He did not find that the appellant "ad-
minisered drugs" to the complaining witness as charged 
in the complaint (R. 60). On the contrary, based on 
the above evidence the trial judge found appellant guilty 
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor by taking 
without the consent of her parents, and sentenced 
him to six months in the county jail, the maximum for 
a misdemeanor. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MATERIAL Y ARIAN CE B E T '¥ E E N 
PLEADING AND PROOF IS FATAL AND 
ENTITLES APPELLANT TO AN ACQUIT-
TAL. 
The complaint alleged in this case that the defend-
ant contributed to the delinquency of a minor by "hypo-
dermically adrninisteriny drugs to the said child and 
this without the knowledge or consent of the parents" 
(R. 47). The trial judge in his findings of fact found 
a violation of a separate offense. He found that the 
defendant "took Wanda Palmer without the knowledge 
or consent of the parents" (R. 60). The only language 
in the Juvenile Act that has any reference to taking is 
found in Utah Code Annotated of 1953, Section 55-10-
80 ( 3) Laws of Utah (1965) as follows: 
" (a) ny person who forcibly takes a child fr?m, 
or encourages him to leave the legal or physical 
5 
custody of any person, agency or institution in 
which the child has been legally placed for the 
purpose of care . . . " 
Since the complaining witness left home and was 
taken by a friend of hers (Tr. line 27, p. 4) , whom she 
is either shielding or can't identify, the statute obviously 
has no application to defendant. The defendant did not 
take the complaining witness, nor was she at any time in 
the legal custody of any person, agency or institution 
for the purpose of care. Even assuming arguendo that 
the defendant took her from the custody of the unknown 
driver (the record states that the driver took the com· 
plaining witness to defendant's apartment, (Tr. line 
27, p. 4) ) , she certainly was not in the legal custody 
of the driver who picked her up. The statute was aimed 
at the evil of preventing parents from removing chil· 
dren from the homes they had been placed in for adop· 
tion or temporary custody pending a determination of 
a charge of parental abuse. The policy of the statute 
is not frustrated nor is it applicable in this case where 
the complaining witness left home on her own volition, 
without inducement on the part of the defendant. 
It is, therefore, clear that the defendant-appellant 
was neither charged with nor were there facts suffi· 
cient to prove a violation of Utah Code Annotated 
of 1953, Section 55-10-80(3) Laws of Utah (1965). 
The general offense of contributing to the delin· 
quency of a minor has been repealed, Section 55-10-51, 
Utah Code Annotated ( 1953). The only provision 
6 
other than 55-10-80 ( 3) which could apply to the facts 
is 55-10-80 ( 1) . The juvenile court's jurisdiction must 
have been exercised under the section which states that 
" (a) ny person who . . . contributes to, or becomes re-
sponsible for the neglect or delinquency of a minor 
... " Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 55-10-80 
( 1) added by Laws of Utah ( 1965). Since defendant 
was charged with a violation of 55-10-80 ( 1) and the 
trial judge found a violation of 55-10-80 (3) the de-
fendant had no opportunity to defend himself against 
the otf ense in the code charged in the complaint and 
the state failed to meet its burden of proof. State v. 
Beckendorf!, 4 Utah 79, 10 P. 1073 (1923). 
This court in State v. Spencer, 101 Utah 274, 111 
P. 2d 455 ( 1942) observed: 
"The purpose of a bill of particulars is to 
inform the defendant of the particulars of the 
offense sufficiently to enable him to prepare his 
defense." 
It is at once apparent that the purpose of the bill 
of particulars or complaint was subverted in this case 
where the defendant-appellant was charged with one 
offense and found guilty of another without an oppor-
tunity to prepare a defense. 
A material variance between pleading and proof 
eutitled the defendant to an acquittal. In 42 C.J.S. 
Indictments and Informations,§ 254 (1944), the fol-
lowing historical summary is found: 
7 
"While it has been held that a variance with 
respect to a material matter is fatal and entitles 
the accused to an acquittal, this being the rule 
at common law, the rule has been radically 
changed. The fatality of the variance depending 
not on whether it is il). respect of a material mat-
ter, but on whether the variance itself is material 
or affects the substantial rights of the accused." 
In Utah the common law has been altered in Sec· 
tion 77-21-43 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as fol· 
lows: 
"No variance between the allegations of an in-
formation, indictment or bill of particulars, which 
state the particulars of an offense, whether 
amended or not, and the evidence offered in sup· 
port thereof shall be grounds for acquittal of the 
defendant. The court may at any time cause the 
information, indictment, or variance to conform 
to the evidence." 
This court in State v. Meyers, 5 Utah 2d 365, 302 
P. 2d 276 ( 1956), in noting that the foregoing statute 
applies to matters of form, not substance and that the 
statute could not be used to override the constitutional 
guarantee that "the accused shall have the right ... 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him." UTAH CONST., Art. I § 12, observed: 
"It would be a mockery of the constitutional 
right of a defendant to allow the state to falsely 
state the particulars of the offense. charged. ~nd 
then without amendment, and without g1vmg 
defendant additional time to meet new evidence 
beyond these particulars obtain a conviction 
founded on such evidence." 
8 
Therefore, the common law rule that a variance 
entitles the defendant to an acquittal has been altered 
in Utah only with regard to matters of form. This 
court's interpretation of the statute is further supported 
by a provision in that same section which gives de-
fendant a right to appeal based on a variance where he 
has been prejudiced in his defense upon the merits. 
Section 77-21-43 ( 4), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
provides: 
"No appeal, or motion made after verdict, 
based on any such defect, imperfection, omission 
or variance shall be sustained unless it is affirm-
ativel,1; shown that the defendant was in fact 
prejudiced thereby in his defense upon the 
merits.'' 
Since defendant was charged with "hypodermically 
administering drugs'' to the complaining witness and 
the trial judge made findings of fact that he "took her" 
without the consent of her parents it is at once obvious 
that the defendant was prejudiced in his defense upon 
the merits for he was completely surprised. He had 
no warning that he had been charged with taking the 
complaining witness and the first notification of that 
charge came in the trial judge's findings of fact at the 
conclusion of the trial. 'Vhile this court has stated that 
it would be a mockery of justice to introduce evidence 
falsely stating the particulars of an offense, State v. 
Meyers, supra, how much more of a mockery would it 
be to falsely accuse of one offense and then without 
any evidence find a violation of a separate offense as in 
the instant case? 
9 
\Vhere a person is charged with a lesser included 
offense, petty larceny, and the state attempts to prove 
grand larceny the defendant is entitled to a new trial 
to afford him time to meet the further allegations as 
to value. This court observed in State v. Meyers, supra: 
"Thus in the instant case had the bill of par· 
ticulars alleged the value of the property stolen 
from Luck to have been $3 for the wallet, $20 
cash, $60 for the watch and $45 for the glasses 
and the proof had shown them to be worth $2, 
$10, $50, and $30 respectively, no substantial 
prejudice to defendant's right would be shown 
and the conviction would be affirmed on that 
ground. \Vhen, however, the bill alleged $22 
total value and the state offers to and contends 
it did prove $92, the defendant must be afforded 
time to meet such further allegations of value." 
But where one is charged with one offense and 
found guilty of another separate offense he is entitled 
to an acquittal. In State v. TaJJlor, 14 Utah 2d 107, 
378 P. 2d 252 (1961), this court held that a person 
charged with embezzlement may not be convicted, even 
though he admits in court to having stolen the goods, 
for the state must prove that he obtained the goods 
through a trust. One who wrongfully obtains goods 
cannot have obtained them through a trust and con· 
verted them for his own use. Thus in acquitting and 
reversing the judgment against the defendant this 
court observed: 
"The judgment must stand or fall upon the 
proof or lack thereof, of the crime with which 
the state charged the defendant, essayed to prove, 
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and of >which he stands convicted . ... Since the 
state did nut prove the charge upon which the 
conviction is grounded it is reversed." 
Massachusetts has a statute similar to the Utah 
statute on variance which has also been interpreted 
as being applicable to matters of form and not sub-
stance. Iu fact the statute specifically provides that 
an acquittal is proper when the defendant has been 
prejudiced in his defense. In Commonwealth v. Stone, 
300 Mass. 160, 14 N .E. 2d 158 ( 1938), the l\iassa-
chusetts court observed: 
"(T)he provision of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 277, 
§ 35 that 'a defendant shall not be acquitted on 
the grounds of a variance between the allega-
tions and the proof if the essential elements of 
the crime are correctly stated, unless the defend-
ant is duly prejudiced thereby' does not apply. 
. . ( T) he evidence adduced at trial was not suf-
ficient to prove the commission of the offense 
in the manner charged in the indictment, and 
that the denial of defendant's motion for a di-
rected verdict of not guilty was prejudicial 
" error. 
In the instant case, not having sufficient evidence 
to prove the commission of the offense in the manner 
charged, the trial judge then made findings of fact 
of an offense which had never been lodged against 
defendant. Defendant-appellant was charged with 
"hypodermically administering drugs", a point on which 
the evidence is at best equivocal (Tr. line 2, p. 7; line 
4, p. 8), and found guilty of taking the complaining 
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witness "without the knowledge or consent of the par-
ents'', an offense which is inapplicable to the facts as 
stated previously. This court in State v. Beckendorf!, 
supra, observed that though an offense may be com-
mitted in a number of ways, the state has the burden 
of proving the crime was committed in the mode charged 
in the complaint. 
On the basis of the record, as in the Stone and Taylor 
cases, the evidence adduced at trial was not sufficient 
to prove the commission of the offense in the manner 
charged and defendant was materially prejudiced in 
his defense thereby affording grounds for an acquittal. 
POINT II 
FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO WAIVE 
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL IN OPEN COURT AS REQUIRED BY 
LAW IS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND THE 
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
An extensive search of the record reveals that the 
defendant was denied his constitutional right to " .. · 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury. UTAH 
CONST. Art. I, § 12. The record is barren of any 
reference whatsoever to defendant's having waived his 
right to a jury trial. This right has been implemented 
by a statute which requires that in criminal cases 
" ( i) ssues of fact must be tried by a jury ... " Section 
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77-27-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. That the con-
stitutional right to a jury trial was not intended to be 
abridged in criminal cases involving adult offenders in 
the juvenile court is made clear in Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, Section 55-10-81 added by ch. 165 Section 
19 ( 1965) as follows: 
"In proceedings in adult cases the practice and 
procedure of the juvenile court shall conform 
to the practices and procedure provided by law 
or rule of court for criminal proceedings in the 
district court, except that the proceedings may 
he commenced by complaint and a trial by jury 
shall consist of four jurors:' 
Further, that the legislature deemed the right to 
jury trial applicable to misdemeanors as well as to 
felonies in district court proceedings to which Section 
55-10-81 applies, and that the right is inviolate unless 
waived in open court is demonstrated in Section 77-1-11, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as follows: 
"No person shall be convicted of a public of-
fense unless by the verdict of a jury, accepted 
and recorded by the court or upon a plea of 
guilty. or upon a judgment against him upon 
a demurrer when he refused to plead or upon a 
judgment of a court for a public offense not 
amounting to a felony, a jur;1J having been 
waived:' 
The sanctity of this right is further demonstrated 
by the mandate that the right may only be waived in 
ope11 court. Section 77-27-2, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, provides as follows: 
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"Issues of fact must be tried by a jury, but 
in all cases except when a sentence of death may 
be imposed trial by jury may be waived by the 
defendant. Such waiver shall be made in open 
court and entered in the minutes." 
According to a similar provision in the California 
Constitution, consent may not be implied but must 
expressly appear in the court records. The pertinent 
part of that provision states that a trial by jury may 
be waived in all criminal cases when " . . . expressed in 
open court by the defendant and his counsel." CALIF. 
CONST. Art I, § 7. 'Vhere counsel for the defendant 
and the district attorney stipulated in open court that 
the right to jury trial had been waived the California 
court in reversing and remanding for a new trial stated 
in People v. Spinale, 100 C.A. 600, 280 Pac. 691 (1940) 
that: 
"When the Constitution has prescribed the 
method and form of such waiver, it cannot other-
wise be accomplished." 
In a similar case involving counsel's attempted 
waiver of defendant's right to a jury trial the same 
court in People v. Garcia, 98 Cal. App. 702, 277 Pac. 
7 47 ( 1929), observed: 
"It is quite apparent that respondent was de-
prived of a Constitutional right which he di.d 
not waive in the manner required by the orgamc 
law of this state, and that the order entered pur-
suant to an attempted but abortive waiver was 
errer which the trial court had power to rectify 
upon a motion for a new trial . . . From the pre-
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vious rulings and the express language of the 
Constitution, it is at once obvious that this in-
violate constitutional right may not be taken 
away in disregard of the fundamental legal 
privilege and power of election guaranteed to 
the party charged, by attempting to vest in his 
representative the dual capacity and authority 
of counsel and accused." 
Further, it has been held that where the clerk's 
minutes showed that all defendants waived their rights 
to a jury trial but the reporter's transcript did not show 
a waiver by the appellant-defendant, the doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the defendant and a new trial 
granted in order to protect the constitutional right 
to a jury trial. The California court in People v. Wash-
inyton, 95 C.A. 2d 454, 213 P. 2d 70 (1950), observed: 
"Under the circumstances in the present case 
it is not clear that the defendant Washing ton 
personally expressed in open court that he con-
sented to a waiver of the trial by jury, and for 
that reason the judgment as to the defendant 
\V ashington and the order denying his motion 
for a new trial should be reversed, and the case 
as to said defendant should be remanded for 
a new trial." 
The Word Demand Should Not Be Interpreted 
In The Abstract, But In The Sense Intended In The 
Act. 
\Vhile it is possible to argue to the contrary it is 
not reasonable to presume that the legislature intended 
to restrict the right to jury trial in cases of adult offend-
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ers in the juvenile court merely because of language 
which uses the word "de,mand'' in reference to the pro-
cedure for transferring a case to a city or county court 
in the event that a defendant does not plead guilty 
or waive his right to a jury trial. The Juvenile Court 
Act provides in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 
55-10-81, added by ch. 165 Section 19 ( 1965) as fol-
lows: 
"If the defendant in proceedings under this 
section shall demand a jury trial, the court may 
transfer the case to a city court or county court 
if such a court is in existence in the county in 
which the offense was committed." 
To construe that provision as requiring the defend-
ant to demand a jury or waive his constitutional right 
would be inconsistent with the first paragraph in the 
same section. Utah Code Annotated of 1953, Section 
55-10-81 added by ch. 165 Section 19 ( 1965) pro-
vides in the first paragraph as follows: 
"In proceedings in adult cases the practice 
and procedure of the juvenile court shall con-
form to the practice and procedure provided by 
law or rule of court for criminal proceedings in 
the district court, except that the proceedings 
may be commenced by complaint and a trial by 
jury shall consist of four jurors." 
As noted previously in the district courts the right 
to a jury trial in misdemeanor charges must be " ... 
waived in open court and entered in the minutes." Sec-
tion 77-27-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, see also 
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Section 77-1-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. It is 
submitted that the intent of the legislature was merely 
to provide the juvenile court with a means for trans-
ferring jury cases due to the fact that city and district 
courts are better equipped to handle jury trials. \Vhile 
it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that 
effect must be given, if possible, to every word in a 
statute, this is not an inflexible doctrine requiring blind 
application as is noted in SUTHERLAND, STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION § 4706 (3rd. Ed. 1943) 
as follows: 
"The literal interpretation of the words of an 
act should not prevail if it creates a result con-
trary to the apparent intention of the legislature 
and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit 
vf a construction which will effectuate the legis-
lative intention . ... The particular inqury is 
not what is the abstract force of the words or what 
they may comprehend, but in what seMe were 
they intended to be used in the act." 
Since Section 55-10-81 does not state that the de-
fendant must demand a jury trial or be deemed to 
have waived his constitutional right, the apparent in-
tent of the legislature to insure equal treatment to those 
charged with a misdemeanor whether in the district or 
juvenile court should not be frustrated by implication. 
The word "demand" is flexible when viewed in 
context, for the paragraph in which it is found is 
designed to give the juvenile court judge the power to 
tran,~f er cases wherein the defendant has not pleaded 
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guilty or waived his right to a jury trial. Since the 
right of a jury trial is inviolate, the word demand 
merely states the obvious, that is, in the absence of a 
waiver there is a conclusive presumption of a demand 
for a jury trial. 
Further, if the legislature intended to provide 
that the right to a jury trial would be waived if not 
demanded they would have provided a third exception 
to the first paragraph of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
Sectoin 55-10-81 added by ch. 165, Section 19 ( 1965) 
as follows: 
"In proceedings in adult cases the practice and 
procedure . . . shall conform to the practice 
and procedure by law or rule of court for crimi-
nal proceedings in the district court, etccept that 
the proceedings may be commenced by complaint 
and a trial by ,jury shall consist of four ,jurors," 
and ... the right to a jury trial is waived if not 
expressly demanded (suggested revision to com-
port with possible construction). 
The Constitutional right to a jury trial is founded 
upon the principles that the collective judgments of 
an impartial tribunal are, perhaps, less subject to preju-
dice, that there is a great value in the participation 
of citizens in the process of government and that juries 
are agencies of mitigation in that they serve to bring 
the law up to date by applying it in a way consistent 
with present day community values. That a judge may 
not invade the province of the jury even in a non-capital 
case for the reason that the accused is entitled to a 
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trial by jury on "all questoins of fact" was made clear 
in State v. Brune, 69 Utah 444, 256 Pac. 109 ( 1927) 
iu accordance with the statutory mandate in Section 
77-27-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Conviction of an adult off ender for contributing 
to the delinquency of a minor without the Constitutional 
guarantee of a trial by jury or the express waiver of 
that right as required by law is reversible error. 
POINT III 
AN INCOl\lPLETE RECORD BASED ON 
THE USE OF A DICTAPHONE 'VHERE AP-
PEAL IS A MATTER OF RIGHT NECESSI-
TATES A REMAND FOR NEW TRIAL BE-
CAUSE: 
I) APPELLANT HAS BEEN DENIED 
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PRO-
TECTION OF LAWS. 
2) THIS COURT HAS NOTHING TO RE-
VIEW WITH RESPECT TO THE 
01\fITTED TESTIMONY. 
3) THE USE OF A MECHANICAL DE-
VICE IS NOT AN AUTHORIZED DE-
VICE FOR RECORDING TESTIMONY 
IN AN ADULT OFFENDER CASE IN 
THE JUVENILE COURT AND THE 
DISTORTION OF THE RECORD SUB-
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VERTS APPELLANT'S STATUTORY 
RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM A FINAL 
CONVICTION. 
* * * 
I) AN INCOMPLETE RECORD IS A DE-
NIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PRO-
TECTION 'VHERE APPEAL IS A MATTER 
OF RIGHT. 
Equal Protection: 
Where appeal is a matter of right exercisable only 
by the defendant who has means enough to pay the 
cost of a transcript in advance there is denial of equal 
protection within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. 
The reasoning of the court is that the financial ability 
to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship 
to a defendant's guilt or innocence and cannot be used 
to justify depriving defendant of a fair trial. Further, 
there is no meaningful distinction between a rule which 
would deny the poor the right to def end themselves 
in court and one which effectively denies the poor of 
an adequate appellate review by demanding costs be 
paid in advance. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
The financial ability to pay bears no more rational 
relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence than 
does the accident of the forum and neither can be used 
to justify depriving a defendant of a fair trial. If 
appellant had been charged with a misdemeanor in the 
district court he would have been supplied with a ver-
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batim record for purposes of appeal, since a reporter 
would have been present during the trial. Having been 
charged, however, in the juvenile court he was unable 
to obtain a complete record. The mechanical recorder 
used in the juvenile court was unable to accurately re-
cord the proceedings. 
In Utah " (a) n appeal may be taken by the de-
fendant, ( 1) from a final judgment of conviction." 
Section 77-39-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Thus, 
appeal being a matter of right exercisable only by a 
defendant who has an accurate record on which the 
appellate court can review the action of the trial court, 
appellant was denied due process and equal protection 
within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. It is not 
sufficient to state that the part of the transcript which 
is audible is sufficient to provide a clear record from 
which to exercise the right to appeal for no one can 
say that what is missing is immaterial without knowing 
exactly what information is being discounted. An in-
complete record is just as bad as no record at all for 
the testimony or evidence which was most clearly preju-
dicial or erroneous affording grounds for a new trial 
may very well be that which reads "inaudible" on the 
transcript. There is no rational basis for distinguishing 
between treatment in the district court and in the juve-
nile court with regard to an adult off ender charged 
with a misdemeanor for the reason that the rehabilita-
tive purpose with regard to juveniles cannot be said 
to apply equally to adult offenders. 
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The following are examples of such "inaudible" 
areas on the dictaphone belt: 
Line 21 Judge Garff: 
Line 22 Mr. Grousman: 
Line 31 Mr. Grousman: 
Line 32 Miss Palmer: 
Line 23 Mr. Grousman: 
Line 24 
Line 25 
Line 26 .Miss Palmer: 
Line 5 Judge Garff: 
Line 6 ]\fr. Gundry: 
Line 8 Judge Garff: 
(Inaudible) Page I 
(Inaudible) Page 6 
(Did you use it Page 6 
yourself?) referring 
to needle 
(Inaudible) Page 6 
(Did you stay in Page 8 
the apartment 
the entire two 
days?) 
(Next part inaud- Page 8 
ible on the dicta-
phone belt) 
(Next part inaud- Page 8 
ible on the dicta-
phone belt) 
(If I could have Page 8 
some) 
(You're forget- Page 25 
ing about Wan-
da's rights.) 
(This witness has Page 25 
waived her rights 
by taking the 
stand against 
this man.) 
( .. more time.) Page 25 
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Due Process 
In a case where the court reporter had died prior 
to completing the transcription of his notes and another 
person was allowed to try and decipher the notes with 
the aid of statements from the judge and the prosecutor, 
in the face of a formal protest from the Court Report-
ers' Association of Los Angeles to the effect that there 
was grave doubt that anyone could furnish a usable 
transcript from the notes due to the fact that many 
portions were completely indecipherable, the Supreme 
Court held that an ex parte settlement of the state 
court record violated petitioner's right to procedural 
due process in not having been represented at the hear-
ings either in person or by counsel. The order of the 
court was to remand to the district court to enter an 
order to allow California a reasonable time to perfect 
the record, petitioner being represented at such hear-
ings and that failing to do so within six months peti-
tioner should bereleased. The reasoning of the court 
was that the due process clause of the 14th Amend-
ment required the opportunity for review on a review-
able record. Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 ( 1957). 
In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 ( 1937), the 
Supreme Court laid down the following guide lines 
as to whether state procedure violates 14th Amendment 
standards of due process: 
"Does it violate those fundamental principles 
of liberty and justice which die at the base of all 
our civil and political institutions?" ... Or is it 
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"so acute and shocking that our policy will not 
endure it?" 
The court in Palko in rejecting the defendant's 
claim of double-jeopardy as a bar to a new trial rea-
soned that "if the trial had been infected with error 
adverse to the accused, there might have been a review 
at his instance, and as often as necessary to purge the 
taint. A reciprocal privilege has now been granted the 
state." Palko v. Connecticut, supra. 
In the instant case appellant's contention that an 
incomplete record is a denial of due process for pur-
poses of perfecting his right to an appeal unless the 
court grants appellant a new trial. It is a violation 
of fundamental principles of liberty and justice to say 
that one has a right to appeal on the basis of error as 
shown by the record when the means used to record 
the trial produces an incomplete record. The very 
error which might have deprived appellant of due pro-
cess may be hidden by a caption on the record which 
reads "inaudible". 
2) THIS COURT HAS NOTHING TO RE-
VIEW WITH RESPECT TO THE OMITTED 
TESTIMONY. 
Even if this court finds that due process was not 
violated the absence of a complete record for purposes 
of review is prejudicial error. In a case where the re-
porter was not present during oral argument to the 
jury the court stated that the judge is required to 
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make a proper record of the proceedings at the time 
of their occurrence. If he cannot recall what was said 
he must determine the facts from the next best evi-
dence, the testimony of those who were present. But, 
of course, where the litigants are in dispute it would be 
impossible to fairly reconstruct what was said and the 
appellate court with respect to the omitted argument, 
having nothing it can review, is forced to remand for 
a new trial. State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 151 Pac. 518 
(1915). 
Since defendant has been charged with "adminis-
tering drugs'' to the complaining witness it is crucial 
that the appellate court has a complete record of her 
testimony. However, when she was asked, with refer-
ence to the hypodermic needle, " ( d) id you use it your-
self?" (Tr. line 31, p. 6), the record reads "inaudible" 
(Tr. line 32, p. 6). When asked if she stayed in the 
apartment the entire two days the record reads "next 
part inaudible on the dictaphone belt" (Tr. lines 24 
& 25, p. 8). Further when defendant's counsel ob-
jected to the complaining witness's refusal to testify 
except as to selected matters the trial judge stated 
"(y)ou're forgetting about Wanda's rights" (Tr. line 
5, p. 25). Defendant's attorney then objected saying 
" ( t) he witness has waived her rights by taking a stand 
against this man" (Tr. line 6, p. 25). The ruling on 
the objection is not ascertainable for all that appears 
is " ... more time." (Tr. line 8, p. 25). Other inaudible 
portions of the record are found on line 21, p. 1, trial 
judge and line 22, p. 6, prosecuting attorney. 
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There is no distinguishable difference between the 
absence in the record on appeal of oral argument to 
the jury and the inaudible and thus absent statements 
of court, counsel and complaining witness, as in the 
instant case. In either case the appellate court has 
nothing to review, having no magic powers to per-
ceive what was said and not recorded, and must, there-
fore, order a new trial. 
3) THE USE OF A MECHANICAL DEVICE 
IS NOT AN AUTHORIZED DEVICE FOR 
RECORDING TESTIMONY IN AN ADULT 
OFFENDER CASE IN THE JUVENILE 
COURT AND THE DISTORTION OF THE 
RECORD SUBVERTS APPELLANT'S STAT-
UTORY RIGHT TO APPEAL FROM A FINAL 
CONVICTION. 
A recording device is not authorized as the proper 
means of making a verbatim record when trying an 
adult offender in the juvenile court. With regard to 
hearings, the Juvenile Court Act in Utah Code Anno· 
tated of 1953, § 55-10-96, added by ch. 165, § 35 (1965), 
provides: 
" (a) verbatim record of the proceedings shall 
be taken, by a court stenographer or by means 
of a mechanical recording device, in all cases 
which might result in deprivation of custody. In 
all other cases a verbatim record shall also be 
made, unless dispensed with by the court." 
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The words deprivation of custody in the first 
sentence indicate that the legislature intended the sec-
tion allowing mechanical recording devices to apply 
only to cases involved juvenile offenders. The second 
sentence seems to indicate that in all other cases the 
testimony may be recorded by a mechanical device, but 
a reading of the statute on adult offenses demonstrates 
that the legislature did not mean to include the phrase 
"other cases" those involving adult offenses. Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, § 55-1--81 added by ch. 165, § 19 
( 1965) provides: 
"In proceedings in adult cases the practice and 
procedure of the juvenile court shall conform to 
the practice and procedure provided by law or 
rule of court for criminal proceedings in the 
district court." 
In the district courts there is no procedure allow-
ing the use of mechanical recording devices but on the 
contrary the statute provides that " ( t) he judge of the 
district court may appoint shorthand reporters to report 
the proceedings of the court." Utah Code Annotated, 
78-56-1, ( 1953) . Further, the shorthand reporter has 
a statutory duty to attend all sessions of court. Section 
78-56-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"It shall be the duty of the shorthand reporter 
to attend all sessions of court, and to take full 
stenographer notes of the evidence given and of 
all proceedings therein had, except when the 
judge dispenses with his services in a particular 
cause or with respect to a portion of the pro-
ceedings thereof.'' 
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While the statute allows the judge to dispense 
with the services of a reporter, it does not authorize 
him to use any other means of reporting, and further 
the discretion of the judge to dispense with the reporter 
has been severely limited by judicial interpretation. 
Where testimony is disputed on appeal and the trial 
judge cannot recall what was said the appellate court 
will reverse and remand for a new trial, having nothing 
it can review with respect to the testimony in question. 
State v. Baum, supra. 
Further, assuming for the sake of argument that a 
recording device is permissible, in the trial of an adult 
offender, an inaudible and thus incomplete record would 
not meet the statutory command of "verbatim record" 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 55-10-96, added 
by ch. 165, § 35 ( 1965). That a verbatim record may 
not be dispensed with in cases where deprivation of 
custody might result demonstrates the legislature's 
intent to make certain that when the treatment of juve-
niles is penal in nature the right to appeal should not 
be thwarted due to the absence of a verbatim record 
for purposes of appellate review. Certainly, no lesser 
protection was intended for adult offenders who might 
lose their freedom by receiving a six month jail sentence. 
There are good reasons why the legislature has not 
provided for reporting by means of a mechanical de-
vice. A committee of judges and lawyers studied the 
effects of the latest types of tape recording equipment 
in the U. S. District Court in Washington, D.C., and 
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submitted a report on May 11, 1961. Their report gave 
the following reasons for rejecting the recording de-
vices in favor of maintaining the court reporter system: 
"The machine possesses too great a sensitivity 
in that it records not only the spoken word, but 
coughing, footsteps, rustling of paper and other 
extraneous noises. Speech which takes place be-
yond the perimeter of the microphone is inaud-
ible. In other instances involving proceedings 
with multiple parties or multiple counsel, it is 
difficult to distinguish from one sound tape pre-
cisely what has occurred or who was speaking. 
"The machine, therefore, lacks the very impor-
tant human function of discriminating intelli-
gently as to what transpired." Everett G. Rode-
baugh, Sound Recording in the Courtroom: A 
Reappraisal, 47 ABA J 1185 ( 1961). 
Due to the defects in the quality of producing the 
verbatim record the Legislature has wisely not allowed 
mechanical recording devices to be used in the district 
courts. To do so would subvert the purpose of the 
statute providing for court reporters which is to afford 
assistance to the court and counsel in conducting the 
trial and drawing up findings and bills of exception, 
82 C.J.S. Stenographers, § 9 (1953). Since the leg-
islature has not allowed mechanical recording devices, 
their use in this case where the record is incomplete is 
prejudicial error. 
An incomplete record makes meaningful appeal 
impossible. "There the Code of Criminal Procedure 
gives a right to appeal within the terms of the statute, 
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the use of a reporting device which produces an in-
complete record would be prejudicial to the rights of 
the accused and costly to the state who would have to 
grant a new trial on the ground that the record affords 
nothing to review. "An appeal may be taken by the 
defendant ( 1) from a final judgment of conviction." 
Utah Code Annotated, 77 -39-3 ( 1953) . It has been 
held that where a stenographer loses his notes so that 
a complete record cannot be presented, the trial court 
should grant a new trial and save the expense of taking 
the case to the appellate court who will review and 
remand for a new trial. Elliott v. State, 5 Okl .Crim. 
Reporter 63, 113 Pac. 213 (1911). 
Even when the parties cannot reach an agreement 
as to the unrecorded testimony or the trial judge cannot 
recall what was said the court should reverse and re-
mand a new trial. See State v. Baum, supra. 
Since, however, memories have faded since the 
trial and the possibility of obtaining an accurate record 
is highly dubious due to the fact that line 21, page I; 
line 22, page 6; line 32, page 6; line 24,, page 8; line 
25, page 8; and line 8, page 25 are inaudible as indicated 
by the record on appeal, appellant should be granted 
a new trial. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS A COMPLETE ABSENCE 
OF PROOF THAT THE COMPLAINING "\¥IT-
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NESS WAS INJECTED WITH A DRUG AND 
THAT THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF WERE 
DONE \VITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR 
CONSENT OF THE COMPLAINING WIT-
NESS' PARENTS OR THAT THE ACTS CON-
TRIBUTED TO THE MINOR'S DELIN-
QUENCY. 
Defendant was found guilty of contributing to 
the delinquency of a minor by "hypodermically admin-
istering drugs" to the complaining witness. But a 
thorough search of the record has failed to produce 
any evidence which could in the least substantiate that 
finding. The prosecution has left a void in a most 
essential step in proving the guilt of the accused. To 
convict a man of administering drugs without any proof 
whatsoever that what was administered was a drug is 
unthinkable. 
The complaining witness could only testify that 
there was "something in a needle" ( R. p. 5, 1.23) ; 
that it "was white liquid" ( R. p. 8, 1.2). Milk is a white 
liquid. A mixture of sugar and water is a white liquid. 
In response to the question: "Do you know what was 
in that needle?" (R. p. 9 1.23), she could only reply 
"No" (R. p. 9, 1.24). But compare that answer with 
her unequivocal response to the prosecutor's question 
concerning her dealings with others after she left de-
fendant: the prosecutor's question: "Did they give you 
any drugs?" (R. p. 16 1.17), and her reply, "Yes" (R. 
p. 16 1.20). 
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The closest the prosecution could come in estab-
lishing that a drug had been administered was in elicit-
ing the complaining witness' reaction to the injection, 
and that consisted solely of "I felt kind of drowsy 
and I felt really good." (R. p. 9 l.32). It is common 
knowledge that even a psychological reaction can go 
much further than those simple effects (to which this 
witness is certainly subject, no derogation of the wit-
ness intended) . See in general, Aldrich, Dynamic Psy-
chiatry ( 1966) . 
The complaining witness did not say she was under 
the influence of drugs while with defendant, but again 
in relating her activities with people other than de-
fendant she stated then she was under the influence 
of drugs. (See R. p. 18 l.24 & 25). To convict the 
defendant of such a serious offense, that of administer-
ing drugs to a minor, upon the vapor thin evidence 
described above, is unwise at best. Surely the state 
ought to be required to prove its case. 
The defendant was convicted of administering 
drugs to a minor "without the knowledge or consent 
of the parents". (Complaint). Here appellant is con· 
fronted with a hiatus in the prosecution's duty to prove 
its case. Appellant is not quibbling with every jot and 
tittle, but with what appears to be a serious omission. 
Now here in the record is there to be found so much as 
a single statement that what was done was done without 
the knowledge or consent of the parents. We cannot 
assume that the parents would object to what was done. 
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'Vhat was plead must be proved even if just a sem-
blance of proof is all that can be found. 
Assuming arguendo that drugs were administered, 
there was no proof that they in fact, contributed to any 
delinquent behavior on the part of the complaining 
witness. The statute states (and the complaint charges 
in almost the exact language) that anyone "who aids, 
contributes to, or becomes responsible for the neglect 
or delinquency of any child", is guilty of the offense. 
Section 55-10-80 {3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Of 
necessity we cannot avoid being repetitious, there was 
absolutely no evidence produced which indicated in any 
way that the acts alleged produced any behavior which 
could be called delinquent. Without such proof the 
mandate of the statute has not been fulfilled, and it 
cannot be assumed that the legislature intended the 
courts to eliminate their requirements. 
All in all there has been a laxness in this case which 
cannot be tolerated in the field of criminal law. The 
prosecution has failed to prove that ( 1) the complain-
ing witness was injected with a drug; (2) that the 
acts alleged were done without the knowledge or consent 
of the complaining witness' parents; and ( 3) that the 
acts alleged contributed to delinquent behavior of the 
complaining witness. Without proof of even one of the 
above the case must fall; but without proof as to any 
of the elements of the offense charged, the decision is 
beyond question. 
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The Legislature has enacted two statutes which 
must be distinguished. The first states: "Any person 
... who tends to cause children to become delinquent, 
"55-10-80 ( 1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is guilty 
of the crime stated. It is obvious that the provision 
refers to acts which in some way tend to cause delin. 
quency in a child. Thus, it is not necessary that the 
child become a delinquent as a result of the acts. But 
the second provision under consideration, and the one 
which appellant has been charged with violating, is as 
follows: "Any person ... who aids, contributes to, or 
becomes responsible for the neglect or delinquency of 
any child", Section 55-10-80 ( 3) Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, is guilty of the crime stated. The second 
provision "contemplates an existing delinquency and 
that such sitution has been contributed to by another 
... " State v. Clark, 92 Ohio App. 382, llO N.E. 2d 
433 ( 1952) . In such a case the complaint must allege 
and the prosecution must prove that the complaining 
witness is or was a delinquent and the defendant to some 
degree caused or contributed to that status. See State 
v. Clark, supra and Peefer v. State, 42 Ohio App. 276 
182 N.E. ll7 (1931). 
In the instant case the appellant was charged with 
contribunting to the delinquency of a minor, but there 
was no evidence that the acts complained of caused or 
contributed to any delinquent behavior attributed to 
the complaining witness. It would indeed be an extreme 
view to say that an individual could be convicted of 
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contributing to the delinquency of a minor without 
requiring that the minor actually is or was a delinquent. 
The interpretation of the statute sought above 
seems to be an intermediate view, one which both pro-
tects an accused from harrassment, but also meets the 
intent of the legislature. It has already been pointed 
out that one extreme is represented by the New York 
court in People v. Smith, 41 N.Y.S. 2d 512, 266 App. 
Div. 57 ( 1943), where the court requires that the minor 
actually be adjudged a delinquent before the defendant 
can he charged. 
Since the evidence was wholly insufficient to con-
vict appellant of the crime charged, reversal is required. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
431 South 3rd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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